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IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING STATE CREATED RIGHTS INTO THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE NINTH AMENDMENT
By Esteban A. Aguilar, Jr.
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
Professor Gregory Allen in Ninth Amendment and State
Constitutional Rights suggested a hypothetical conflict
that could arise between state and federal courts when a
state constitution provides for greater protection against
governmental abuse of power than the federal constitution. 1
There, he posited a situation where a state requires a
warrant to tape conversations even when the parties have
consented to the recording, or to seize telephone billing
records while federal law does not require a warrant under
either circumstance. 2 If a state police officer then seized
an individual’s telephone billing records without a warrant
in that state, and those records were turned over to
federal agents for use in a federal prosecution, should the
records be admissible or excluded as illegally obtained
evidence? 3
1

Gregory Allen, Ninth Amendment and State Constitutional Rights, 59
Alb. L. Rev. 1659 (1996).
2
Id at 1659-1660, referencing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956-57 (N.J.
1982) (holding that New Jersey State Constitution requires a search
warrant to seize telephone billing records); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State
Law, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 667, 723-24 (1988) (noting no federal limitations
on consensual eavesdropping on electronic surveillance).
3
Id at 1660.

1

New Mexico has recently gone further and asked if a
federal agent seizes records or evidence in violation of
that state’s constitution, should the records be admissible
or excluded? 4
These situations will continue to arise whenever any
state chooses to “exercise its police power or its
sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
federal constitution.” 5

Some state courts have refused to

admit evidence seized illegally according to that state’s
constitution, but it remains to be seen whether a federal
court will follow the lead of those state courts refusing
to admit that evidence as the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” particularly if it is not required under federal
law.
One possible safeguard of autonomy for those states
choosing to grant their citizens greater state law
protections than the federal government is the Ninth
Amendment.

The Ninth Amendment protects “unenumerated

rights” that are retained by the people of the states.

In

4

Id. See for eg. State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 130 N.M.
386, 25 P.3d 225 (holding that evidence seized by federal agents in
violation of the New Mexico Constitution was not admissible in New
Mexico courts), cf. State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327
(1989) (refusing to apply the New Jersey Constitution to the actions of
federal agents because doing so would hinder the principles of
federalism and comity without advancing legitimate state interests).
5
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).

2

theory, applying the Ninth Amendment would essentially
federalize state law protections contained in state
constitutions and guard that state from federal
encroachment.

A federal court would be subjected to the

same law as the forum state and under the earlier
hypothetical, the federal court would be required to
suppress the evidence obtained in violation of the state
constitutional right, which would be federalized through
the Ninth Amendment.
The purpose of this paper is not to introduce the idea
of what effect, if any, the Ninth Amendment should be
given, a topic that has been extensively discussed.
Rather, this paper will examine Professor Calvin R.
Massey’s proposal for recognizing Ninth Amendment Rights,
as well as explore some of the implications of adopting his
three-part test.

It is my hope that examining these

effects will aid a federal court system contemplating
whether to elevate the Ninth Amendment as an enforceable
federal doctrine amid genuine doctrinal concerns against
such an application.
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to

3

deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 6

On its

face, the words of the Ninth Amendment suggest the
existence of additional rights other than those
specifically mentioned in the first eight Amendments that
needed protection from governmental encroachment. 7
Yet, what was the full effect of the Ninth Amendment
the Framers intended?

Professor Akhil Reed Amar suggests

that the Ninth Amendment is based in federalism but “warns
readers not to infer from the mere enumeration of a right
in the Bill of Rights that implicit federal power in fact
exists in a given domain.” 8

Thus, the Ninth Amendment

explicitly protects liberty by preventing Congress from
going beyond its enumerated powers in Article I, section 8
and elsewhere in the Constitution. 9
Professor Amar argues the Ninth Amendment is not
merely duplicative of the Tenth Amendment, which provides:
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” 10
but the two Amendments complement one another. 11

He adds

that “the Tenth says Congress must point to some explicit
6

U.S. Const. amend. IX
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
8
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 123-24 (Yale University Press 1998)
9
Id at 123.
10
U.S. Const. amend. X
11
AMAR, supra note 8, at 123-24.
7

4

or implicit enumerated power before it can act; and the
Ninth addresses the closely related but distinct question
of whether such express or implied enumerated power in fact
exists.” 12

Thus, the Tenth Amendment is about states’

powers and the Ninth is about rights. 13

However, as

Professor Amar recognizes, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
“are at their core about popular sovereignty,” explicitly
invoking “the people.” 14
In seeking to protect that popular sovereignty, James
Madison believed that the Tenth Amendment might be
“unnecessary,” but that “there can be no harm in making
such a declaration.” 15

Yet, Madison’s Ninth Amendment

prevented the “implied diminishment of other rights and the
implied enlargement of enumerated federal power,” and was
necessary to address his own concerns about the possible
dangers of enumerating rights, as well as the concerns of
the state conventions which would be ratifying (or which
could refuse to adopt) the Bill of Rights.
The Nature of Rights and the Ninth Amendment
When discussing rights today what typically comes to
mind are the enumerated rights that individuals seek to
protect through judicial enforcement.
12
13
14
15

Precisely what

Id at 124.
Id.
Id.
1 Annals of Congress 439 (June 8, 1789).

5

“rights” were the so-called “popular sovereignty”
amendments designed to protect and who were they designed
to benefit?

Some scholars argue that the Ninth Amendment

refers to individual “natural rights,” those rights
retained during the transition from the state of nature to
civil society, 16 while others argue that the amendment
protects the collective rights of the people to govern on
all matters not specifically granted to the federal
government, including the ability to choose who will
govern. 17
NATURAL RIGHTS
Natural rights are those basic rights that an
individual enters into society with that no government can
deny. 18

The growth of individualism in the 17th and 18th

centuries led to the belief that individuals, because they
are natural beings and creatures of God, have rights that
cannot be violated by any individual or any society. 19

John

Locke, one of the most famous writers on the subject of
natural rights, argued that all human beings are naturally
in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and

16

See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Constitutional?, 100
Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1991).
17
See Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983).
18
“ Natural Rights”, The Columbia Encyclopedia, Online Version (6ed.
2001).
19
Id.
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dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think
fit…without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any
other man.” 20

Perhaps the most recognizable expression of

this concept comes from Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of
Independence:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.” 21
The Declaration of Independence, coupled with the
enumeration of specific, individualized rights in the first
eight amendments, illustrate why some scholars believe the
Ninth Amendment was designed to protect individual, natural
rights.

Professor Massey argues that the Ninth Amendment

was influenced by an understanding of natural law and was
designed to protect individualized rights:
“The structural role thereby envisioned for the Ninth
Amendment can only be obtained today by treating the
amendment as a source of individual rights judicially
enforceable against…the federal government.” 22
Professor Massey adds that even if the framers
intended the Ninth Amendment only to “hem in federal
legislative power,” that objective can only be realized
today by reading the Ninth Amendment as a source of
20

JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr02.txt.
21
U.S.C.A., Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776).
22
Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment,
61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1992).
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individual rights designed to “frustrate the boundless
exercise of federal legislative power. 23
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
However, as Professor Amar notes, “to see the Ninth
Amendment…as a palladium of countermajoritarian individual
rights—like privacy—is to engage in anachronism.” 24

He

suggests that at the time the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were adopted, the collective rights of “the people” were
the basis for the recognition of popular sovereignty, or
popular rights, rather than rights of a purely individual
nature.

“If the Ninth is mainly about individual rights,”

Professor Amar asks, “why does it not speak of individual
‘persons’ rather than the collective ‘the people’?” 25

He

answers that “the conspicuously collective meaning of ‘the
people’ in the Tenth Amendment (and elsewhere) should alert
us that its core meaning in the Ninth is similarly
collective.”

26

He adds that along with the Preamble’s “We

the people,” the Tenth Amendment’s similarly collective
phrase “to the people” serve as “perfect bookends,
fittingly the alpha and omega of the Founders’
Constitution.” 27

23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 52.
AMAR, supra note 8, at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id at 120.
Id.

8

Professor Amar argues that the ultimate supremacy of
power lies in the “people,” and by accepting this notion,
Constitutional federalism is a double-edged sword with two
systems of government, state and federal.

He explains that

“each constitutionally limited government can deploy its
powers to police the constitutional limits on the other’s
powers and remedy the other’s constitutional violations.” 28
Specifically, the state governments retain “the people’s”
right to revolt in extraordinary times at the first sign of
a national abuse of power, which will, “in all possible
contingencies, afford complete security against invasions
of the public liberty by the national authority.” 29
“ENUMERATED” RIGHTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY
The early state constitutions and declarations of
rights, as well as the debates on the national Bill of
Rights itself, provide a clue as to what additional rights
the founders arguably intended to protect.
New York, for example, was more concerned with
protecting “collective rights” by establishing a libertyenhancing republican government.

New York’s Bill of Rights

did not appear in its original 1777 constitution, and
“seeming individual liberties in the body of the
28

Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalsim, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1492
(June 1987).
29
Id. at 1500-01.

9

constitution, stated in mandatory form, were concerned
primarily not with individuals, but with the structure of
government.” 30

Nowhere did New York’s constitution

explicitly address the protection of individual rights.
However, collective rights such as the right to a jury
trial, freedom of religion and due process, rights that
have individual characteristics, were protected within the
text of the New York constitution. 31
However, at the New York ratifying convention on the
federal Constitution the concerns expressed about the
proposed measure focused on both the civil liberties of the
citizens of the state as well as the collective rights of
the people.

Even before New York voted to ratify the

Constitution, John Lansing in his June 20, 1788 address at
the New York ratifying convention recognized that the
proposed document did not adequately protect civil
liberties, and amendments would be necessary down the road.
Lansing explained he was apprehensive about a consolidated
federal government because the proposed constitution as
written, which gave power to that government, could not
adequately protect the essential rights and liberties of

30

Robert F. Williams, New York’s State Constitution in National
Context, 14 Touro L.Rev. 611, 620 (1998). It wasn’t until 1821 that a
separate bill of rights, similar to those in most states, was adopted
in New York. Id.
31
Id.
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the people. 32

Lansing said that he would support any

amendments down the road that would shield civil liberties
from the possibility of abuse by a centralized Republican
government. 33
Just three days earlier, Robert Livingston argued that
governmental power, whether state or federal, stems from
the collective “people,” pointing to a “little understood,
old world” principle that all power is derived from “the
people.” 34

Livingston pointed out that although all power

stems from and remains with “the people,” those collective
rights are not diminished when those people divide that
power between the state and federal governments for “their
own happiness.” 35

He added that the division and grant of

power actually serves as an additional safeguard of the
collective rights of the people. 36
However, the natural rights theory was just as
prevalent in the constitutional debate in other states.

In

Massachusetts, many delegates of the convention were
concerned that the proposed Constitution had no declaration
of rights.

32

Samuel Nason argued that he would gladly give

DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE ADOPTION
CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (June 20, 1788) available at
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_ny.htm.
33
Id.
34
Id. (June 17, 1788).
35
Id.
36
Id.

OF THE

FEDERAL
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up some natural rights for the greater good, but not if
there were no declaration of protected, individualized
rights written into the document. 37
Theophilus Parsons and others answered this criticism
by arguing that a bill of rights was not necessary since no
governmental entity, either local or federal, could impede
on the natural rights each private citizen enjoyed:
“It has been objected to that we have no bill of
rights. If gentlemen who make this objection would
consider what are the supposed inconveniences
resulting from the want of a declaration of rights, I
think they would soon satisfy themselves that the
objection has no weight. Is there a single natural
right we enjoy, uncontrolled by our own legislature,
that Congress can infringe? Not one.” 38
At the time the federal Bill of Rights was proposed,
several states had in place their own bills of rights that
contained language promoting both the individual natural
rights of the people, as well as the collective rights of
the citizens of their states.

Virginia’s bill of rights,

established several weeks before the Declaration of
Independence, established the collective rights principles
that “all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people,” and that “government is, or ought to be,

37

DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE ADOPTION OF
CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (January 9, 1788), available at
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_ma.htm.
38
ID.

THE
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instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security, of the people, nation, or community.” 39
Virginia’s bill of rights also expressly acknowledged
that all men are by nature free and independent,
recognizing that “the people” have certain inherent rights
which cannot be deprived or divested, “namely the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.” 40
However, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights
accompanying its constitution also protected individualized
civil liberties, such as the right to the free exercise of
religion, the right to a trial by jury, and the right of
freedom of the press. 41
Similarly, Maryland’s Constitution also began with a
declaration of rights, establishing first that the right of
government originates from “the people” and is “instituted
solely for the good of the whole.” 42

The declaration also

grants “the people” the exclusive right of regulating and
policing the internal government, including the right of

39
VA. CONST. OF 1776 (June 12, 1776), available at
http://www.constitution.org/bor/vir_bor.txt
40
Id.
41
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (June 12, 1776), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/virginia.htm
42
CONST. OF MARYLAND (Nov. 11, 1776), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm
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revolt to reform the old or establish a new government. 43
In addition to the collective rights of the people, the
document also protected the individual’s right to freedom
of speech and debate, the right of free individuals to
participate in the legislature, the right to petition the
government for the redress of grievances, and the right
against self-incrimination. 44
New Hampshire’s bill of rights, which also pre-dates
the federal Bill of Rights, recognized that each of its
citizens was born with “certain natural, essential and
inherent rights,” which included “enjoying and defending
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting,
property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining
happiness.” 45

At the same time the New Hampshire

constitution also recognized that some of its citizens’
inherent natural rights would be surrendered in order to
provide for the common welfare of its citizens, although it
was silent as to what those rights would be. 46
Pennsylvania was perhaps the most explicit in
identifying specific rights within its declaration of
rights, many of which were later embodied in the federal

43

Id.
Id.
45
NH. CONST. OF 1783, art. 2 (October 31, 1783), available at
http://www.state.nh.us/constitution/billofrights.html
46
Id. at art. 3.
44

14

Bill of Rights.

For example, in addition to protecting the

collective rights of the people to govern for the benefit
of the community and the right of revolt to alter or
abolish government, as well as the individual rights of the
free exercise of religion and the right to a trial by jury,
Pennsylvania’s document protected the right to a speedy
trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to be
free from warrantless searches and seizures. 47
THE LASH APPROACH
Contrary to the positions that Professors Massey and
Amar have taken that the Ninth Amendment is either about
natural rights or collective rights, Professor Kurt T. Lash
argues that “at the time of the Founding [of the Ninth
Amendment], it was possible to embrace both natural rights
and a strong belief in the collective right of the people
to local self-government.” 48

Professor Lash points to the

dual protections inherent in the state constitutions (as
illustrated above), as well as to the beliefs of the
Founders themselves.
For instance, the North Carolina convention declared
on August 1, 1788, that there are certain natural rights,
of which men, “among which are the enjoyment of life and
47

CONST. OF PENN., available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm
48
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 331, 363 (Dec. 2004)(emphasis added).
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liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.” 49

While this shows a strong belief in natural

rights, North Carolina also proposed an amendment declaring
that “each state…shall respectively retain every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution
delegated to the Congress of the United States,” which
exhibits an understanding of the need to protect the
collective rights of the people as well. 50
Professor Lash explains that while many of the
Founders believed in natural rights, that does not
necessarily conflict with the notion that their colleagues
also had the collective rights of the people in mind.

For

example, Jefferson believed in the natural rights of the
states, and when Congress violated the natural right of
free speech in passing the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison
argued that the acts violated the collective rights of the
states. 51

Thus, although there is a certain level of

ambiguity as to exactly what unenumerated rights the
Founders envisioned when they created the Ninth Amendment,
as Professor Lash points out, the Ninth Amendment can

49

DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ON THE ADOPTION OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, ELLIOT’S DEBATES (August 1, 1788), available at
http://www.constitution.org/rc/rat_nc.htm.
50
Id.
51
See Lash, supra note 47, at 364.

THE
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protect both natural and collective rights consistent with
its role as a constitutional safeguard.
Madison’s Proposal
When he announced his intention to introduce a federal
bill of rights on May 4, 1789, James Madison did so in
order to enhance the liberties and protections of the
Constitution without disparaging state and individual
rights.

52

Though Madison once agreed with some critics

that carefully enumerated grants of power in the
Constitution automatically granted all personal liberties,
and that further enumerating some rights might by
implication diminish unenumerated rights, he ultimately
defended a national bill of rights:
“If we can make the Constitution better in the
opinion of those who are opposed to it, without
weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness
in the judgment of those who are attached to it,
we act the part of wise and liberal men to make
such alterations as shall produce that effect.” 53
However, there was widespread criticism of a proposed
bill of rights.

The first was the position that

enumerating powers in a federal bill of rights could
justify a major expansion of federal powers, eroding the
state’s authority against the federal government, precisely
what the fledgling nation rebelled against a decade
52

RALPH LOUIS KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 290 (The University Press of
Virginia, 5th prtg. 1996).
53
Id.

17

earlier. 54

Alexander Hamilton explained the position,

arguing that bills of rights were not only unnecessary but
dangerous since they could contain various exceptions to
powers which are not granted by the Constitution, thus
“affording a colourable pretext to claim more than were
granted.” 55
This anti-federalist position expressed not a simple
fear of having a central government of enumerated powers;
rather, the concern was how could the states constrain the
possible unfettered governmental expansion of those powers
once they were enumerated in a bill of rights?

As

Professor Lash points out, the concern was that enumerating
rights might imply the “constructive enlargement” of
enumerated powers, which would diminish “the scope of
nondelegated powers, jurisdiction, and rights.” 56

For

example, federal courts, which are empowered to construe
the Constitution and, as branches of the federal
government, would likely do so in favor of federal
authority when conflicts between federal and state
governmental authority arise.
The second criticism was that a national bill of
rights, which would almost certainly be incomplete or
54
55
56

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (A. Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed. 1982).
Id.
See Lash, supra note 47, at 361.
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inaccurate, would jeopardize any unwritten, but retained,
rights of the people which were protected by the
constitutions of the various states.
Thus, it was necessary to draft a rule to address both
criticisms, one that would prevent an unduly broad or
unnecessary expansion of federal power when enumerating
certain rights and at the same time ensure that states
would retain their autonomy over matters that they had
traditionally controlled.
Madison addressed these criticisms in Congress during
the Bill of Rights debates:
“It has been objected also against a bill of
rights,
that,
by
enumerating
particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in
that
enumeration;
and
it
might
follow
by
implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into
the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure.
This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system;
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by
turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution” 57

57
1 Annals of Congress 439 (June 8, 1789). When proposed, the Ninth
Amendment was originally the eleventh of twelve proposed clauses.
However, the first two failed, changing the eleventh and twelfth
clauses into what is today the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. For
purposes of this paper, I will refer to these as the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. See KETCHAM, supra note 52 at 291.
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Madison addressed the concerns of the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike by introducing the preliminary
version of the Ninth Amendment:
“The
exceptions
here
or
elsewhere
in
the
constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by
the
constitution;
but
either
as
actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.” 58
Shortly after his speech in Congress introducing his
draft of the Bill of Rights, Madison was appointed to a
Select Committee consisting of eleven members of the House
of Representatives to consider his proposed amendments to
the Constitution.

The Select Committee, appointed on July

21, 1789, consisted of one Congressional representative
from each state that ratified the Constitution, excluding
only North Carolina and Rhode Island that had not yet
ratified the Constitution.
Roger Sherman of Connecticut sat with Madison on the
Select Committee and proposed a draft amendment that
essentially combined the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
“And the powers not delegated to the government of the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the particular States, are retained by the
States respectively. [N]or Shall any [limitations on]
the exercise of power by the government of the united

58

1 Annals of Cong. 454, 452 (1789).
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States the particular instances here in enumerated by
way of caution be construed to imply the contrary.” 59
Sherman deleted Madison’s reference to “other rights
retained by the people,” choosing to address state autonomy
instead.

However, the Select Committee eventually adopted

Madison’s approach and reinserted his express reference to
rights. 60

On July 28, 1789, the Select Committee reported

back to the House of Representatives with the version of
the Ninth Amendment that we are familiar with today. 61
The Ninth Amendment was formally adopted on December
15, 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified by threefourths of the states, a little more than two years after
it was approved by the House and Senate. 62

Through the

adoption of the Ninth Amendment, Madison effectively
brought the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists together
to assure that “the Constitution would leave intact those
individual rights contained in the state constitutions,
statutes, and common law.” 63

59

Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in VEIT,
FEDERAL

ET. AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
CONGRESS, 266-67 (University Press, Baltimore & London)(1991).
60

Id.
Id.
62
Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69
Va. L. Rev. 223, 258 (1982).
63
Id at 259. See eg. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (A. Hamilton) (Bantam Classic
ed. 1982) (Hamilton argued that the adoption of the Constitution would
not disparage the right to trial by jury retained by the states: “It is
equally true that in those controversies between individuals in which
the great body of the people are likely to be interested, that
institution (trial by jury) will remain precisely in the same situation
61

21

The Ninth Amendment in the United States Supreme Court
Despite its elite position as the ninth of ten
amendments to the Constitution in the Bill of Rights,
discussion of the Ninth Amendment remains infrequent in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Presumably, this is because

of the legitimate fear that recognizing the Ninth
Amendment, which has no structural starting or ending
point, could lead to an explosion of federally enforceable
rights.

Or, perhaps the Supreme Court has not been able to

formulate a structured way to incorporate rights while
providing distinct boundaries on the process to minimize
potential abuse.

In any event, there are no cases that

directly analyze the Ninth Amendment as an enforceable
doctrine, and few that discuss it at all.
According to Professor Lash, the earliest discussion
of the Ninth Amendment came from Justice Story’s dissent in
Houston v. Moore. 64

Professor Lash argues that many Ninth

Amendment scholars have failed to include Houston in their
analyses because Justice Story refers to the Ninth
Amendment as the Eleventh Amendment, its original place

in which it is placed by the state constitutions, and will be in no
degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan under
consideration.”).
64
18 U.S. 1 (1820)(Story, J. dissenting).
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among the proposed amendments prior to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights. 65
In Houston, the State of Pennsylvania prosecuted a
private in the Pennsylvania militia under a state law
requiring militia members to serve when called into
service.

66

In 1814, President Madison ordered the Governor

of Pennsylvania to provide militia members for the war
against Britain, and the private refused comply.

He

contended that the state law was contrary to the
Constitution, arguing that federal power over the militia
was exclusive of state regulation. 67
The Court held that the Constitution did not provide
the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over militia
matters, so the state and federal laws did not conflict. 68
However, Justice Story dissented, arguing that the federal
militia law required a federal prosecution, making
Pennsylvania’s law unconstitutional. 69
Justice Story began by declaring that federal power
only extended to those areas delegated to Congress by the

65

Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 597, 614 (Feb. 2005). Professor Lash also points out that in
the late 18th and early 19th century, many individuals, including
Madison, referred to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as the Eleventh and
Twelfth according to their position on the original proposed list,
rather than their final position upon ratification.
66
Houston, 18 U.S. 1, 2.
67
Id. at 11.
68
Id. at 11-12.
69
Id. at 68-69.
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Constitution, and in all other cases the states retain
concurrent authority with Congress, “not only upon the
letter and spirit of the eleventh amendment of the
constitution, but upon the soundest principles of general
reasoning.” 70

He added that in those instances of

concurrent authority when state and federal law collide,
federal law is “of paramount authority.” 71
Thus, Justice Story argued that simply because the
Constitution has granted some authority to Congress in one
particular area does not necessarily equal an “enumeration
of all the powers which belong to the States” in that
area. 72

What those unenumerated powers are must “depend

upon their (the states) own constitutions; and what is not
taken away by the Constitution of the Unites States, must
be considered as retained by the states or the people.” 73
Professor Lash explains that Justice Story’s
treatment of the Ninth Amendment was aligned with the
Madisonian view that the Ninth “limited the extension of
enumerated federal power into areas of local concern
retained by the people as a matter of right.” 74

He adds

that “to Story, constraining federal power (as opposed to

70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 49.
at 49-50.
at 51.
Lash, supra note 65, at 622.
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guarding particular rights) was the central purpose of the
Ninth,” and Houston shows how Justice Story believed the
Ninth Amendment should be applied to achieve that end. 75
More than a century late in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 76 Chief Justice Hughes argued that
maintaining rights retained by the people through the Ninth
Amendment “does not withdraw the rights which are granted
to the federal government.”

There, the Court examined a

congressional grant of authority to sell electricity,
despite the claim that the state of Tennessee had the right
to local regulation of power. 77

Justice Hughes explained

that the Ninth Amendment question was whether a grant of
federal power to regulate electricity impeded impermissibly
on the collective right of Tennessee to local regulation. 78
Finding that the federal regulation did not deny or
disparage any state right, the Court upheld the
Congressional authority. 79
Several other cases more briefly detail the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment.

In Woods v.

75

Id. This also explains why Justice Story’s dissent dealt heavily
with enumerated powers, a Tenth Amendment (or twelfth to Justice Story)
concept, yet he failed to mention that amendment in Houston.
76
297 U.S. 288, 338 (1936).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 330-31.
79
Id. at 338.
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Cloyd W. Miller Co., 80 the Court upheld the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947 as a valid exercise of Congressional War Power,
noting that the exercise of war powers in times of peace
would not threaten the Ninth Amendment’s retained rights.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 81 the Court held
that the First Amendment provided a right of the press to
attend criminal trials based on the Ninth Amendment. 82
To this day the most notable discussion of the
Amendment was Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut. 83

There, the Court held that a Connecticut

statute prohibiting the use or assistance in use of
contraceptives was unconstitutional because it “concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.” 84

The Court

noted that it was dealing with a “right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties,
older than our school system.” 85

80

333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948).
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
82
See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment:
Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due
Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003), where Schmidt argued that the
Ninth Amendment argument in Richmond Newspapers was inappropriately
used as a rule of construction rather than an explicit guarantee of a
right.
83
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84
Id at 485. The Court additionally held that the statute violated the
First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, explaining its reasoning for
each. See Id at 484.
85
Id at 486.
81
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But, in recognizing the antiquity of the fundamental
right to privacy in marriage, the majority opinion only
quoted the text of the Ninth Amendment and failed to
analyze how the “unenumerated right” of marital privacy was
deserving of protection under the Ninth Amendment.

Justice

Goldberg, realizing the deficiency in the majority’s
opinion, added “words to emphasize the relevance of that
[Ninth] Amendment to the Court’s holding.” 86

In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg argued the
Ninth Amendment supports the right of a married couple’s
privacy in the first substantial judicial body of work
advocating a Ninth Amendment rights issue. 87

Concluding

that the concept of liberty embraces the fundamental and
basic right of marital privacy within the language and
history of the Ninth Amendment, he stressed the importance
of giving the Amendment its due effect:
“To hold that a right so basic and fundamental
and so deeprooted in our society as the right of
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that
right is not guaranteed in so many words by the
first eight amendments to the Constitution is to
ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no
effect
whatsoever.
Moreover,
a
judicial
construction that this fundamental right is not
protected by the Constitution because it is not
mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first

86

Id at 487.
See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment:
Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due
Process, 32 U. Balt. L. Rev. 169 (2003).
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eight amendments or elsewhere in the constitution
would violate the Ninth Amendment.” 88
Yet, after discussing that the Ninth Amendment should
be an enforceable doctrine, Justice Goldberg provided no
test for recognizing Ninth Amendment rights, merely
concluding that the Ninth Amendment was not an independent
source of rights.
Finally, Justice Scalia made a brief mention of the
Ninth Amendment in his dissent in Troxel v. Granville. 89
There, the court held that South Carolina’s grandparent
visitation statute violated a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process right to raise children.

Explaining his

position that the right of parents to direct the upbringing
of their children is among the “unalienable rights” with
which the Declaration of Independence proclaims “all
men…are endowed by their creator,” 90

Justice Scalia argued

that the right to raise children is “among the other rights
retained by the people which the Ninth Amendment says the
Constitution’s unenumeration of rights ‘shall not be
construed to deny or disparage.’” 91

According to Justice

Scalia, since the right is one of the “other retained
rights” contemplated by the Ninth Amendment rather than a

88
89
90
91

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491.
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id at 91.
Id.
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fundamental right, state legislatures have the power to
pass laws concerning a parent’s right to make decisions
regarding their child’s upbringing, but the federal courts
and government lacked the power to affect such a right. 92
THE MASSEY TEST
Professor Massey argues that the Ninth Amendment’s
text, history and structural role in the Constitution
“compels the conclusion that it establishes judicially
enforceable federal constitutional rights with their
substantive source in state constitutions.” 93

Because any

Ninth Amendment rights are those retained by “the people,”
the best expression of “the people’s” intent logically lies
within the state constitutions.
Massey challenges Justice Goldberg’s conclusion that
the Ninth Amendment is not an independent source of rights,
arguing that in order to enforce the doctrine the Ninth
Amendment must have the capacity to serve as an independent
source of rights.

However, Massey’s view is not

inconsistent with Justice Goldberg’s despite his assertion
to the contrary.

Under Massey’s view the Ninth Amendment

would not serve as an independent source of rights.
Rather, as Justice Goldberg’s conclusion suggests, the
92

Id.
Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its
Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1229
(1990).
93
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Ninth Amendment would essentially serve as an incorporation
doctrine, similar to the Fourteenth Amendment, to
federalize rights created by the state constitutions, thus
protecting them from federal intrusion:
“Just as Congress may not use its legislative power to
establish a state religion, it may not use its
legislative power to trench upon [N]inth [A]mendment
rights. Since the substance of those rights is to be
found in state constitutions, the citizens of a state,
through the medium of their constitutions, possess the
apparent authority to disable Congress from limiting
any rights the states specify as worthy of
constitutional protection.” 94
Additionally, under Massey’s approach, Ninth Amendment
rights are capable of alteration or abolishment by the
citizens of the state that defined those rights once they
are federally incorporated.

As a matter of

constitutionalism, the states would remain free to
establish and alter their constitutional law “with any
minor collateral impact on a federal constitutional right
as a recognized part of the design of the Ninth
Amendment.” 95

:

“While [N]inth [A]mendment rights are federal,
their substance is derived wholly from state
constitutional law.
This is consistent with the
animating desire of the [N]inth [A]mendment’s
proponents: to reserve to the people their rights
under local law, and to insulate those rights
from federal invasion.
With these principles in
mind, it seems appropriate for a state polity to
94

Id at 1246.
Id at 1250, noting doctrine established in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
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have within
vitality
of
96
right.”

its
any

own control
given
state

the continued
constitutional

Thus, in essence the Ninth Amendment gives state
citizens the power to preserve certain areas of their lives
from federal intrusion. Massey notes that applying such a
dynamic view of Ninth Amendment rights some citizens of
certain states will undoubtedly enjoy more federally
enforceable individual liberty than others. 97

However, he

argues that all Americans will continue to enjoy the same
basic package of express federal Constitutional rights
under federal law, but only those rights recognized through
the Ninth Amendment will vary from state-to-state. 98

When

the package of federal liberties is insufficient for the
citizens of one jurisdiction, they have the ability to
alter their state constitutions or depart to other
jurisdictions that offer greater individual protections. 99
Massey argues that this is an incidental effect, and
one the Framers intended, for “if Californians believe
privacy to be constitutionally desirable and Michiganders
do not, Michiganders can hardly complain if Congress
invades their personal privacy in a fashion the [N]inth

96
97
98
99

Massey, supra note 93, at 1249.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id.
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[A]mendment would not permit with respect to
Californians.” 100
Additionally, Massey argues that once created, Ninth
Amendment rights must be applicable to both the federal
government and the state that created that right. 101
Because Ninth Amendment rights would be federal rights that
derive their substance from another source of law, the
state constitutions, application of the amendment to the
states amounts to a federally enforced right to make the
states abide by their own law. 102

The logical problem with

this view arises when a state chooses to amend its
constitution.

Is it bound to abide by the earlier state

created federal right “incorporated” through the Ninth
Amendment?

Massey argues that this situation reinforces

his earlier conclusion that once a state alters its
constitutional rights, the substance of the federal Ninth
Amendment right changes with it. 103
However, an additional problem arises in that the
federal government would be compelled to abide by state
created law as a matter of federal Constitutional law, a
form of “reverse preemption” that would essentially operate

100
101
102
103

Id.
Id at 1251.
Id.
Id at 1253.
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as a state power veto on Congress. 104

Specifically, the

Ninth Amendment would act as a safeguard preventing
Congress from using its carefully defined delegated powers
to encroach upon an unenumerated federal right contained
within a state constitution, much in the same manner that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from compelling a
criminal defendant to testify against themselves. 105

While

this “veto” power could provide an important mechanism to
protect unenumerated rights, such a constraint on
Congressional power could also lead to abuse by a state
disagreeing with a legitimate federal legislative scheme.
In order for his theory to work and potentially avoid
such conflicts, Massey proposed a test to define the Ninth
Amendment’s positive rights: a test that preserves the
fundamental liberty of the people of the several states
while protecting the legitimate federal governmental right
to promulgate a sound national policy.

His test operates

only when the asserted Ninth Amendment right is not
preempted by the federal Constitution or federal
Constitutional case law, and would “sift the wheat—
fundamental ‘liberty-bearing’ rights—from the chaff.” 106
MASSEY’S FIRST PRONG
104
105
106

Id. at 1232-33.
Id.
Id at 1257.
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First, the proposed right must be fundamental, and
must be limited to those rights that preclude government
action. 107

Asking whether a Ninth Amendment right within a

state constitution is fundamental ensures that only those
rights that are compatible with the “ethos” of the nation
are recognized. 108

Massey recognizes that determining what

constitutes a fundamental right is tricky, but current
tests that rely upon history and tradition could be
employed. 109

Additionally, Massey argues that governmental

intrusion on otherwise lawful individual conduct would be
presumed invalid unless the government can show a
justification for the intrusion:

“The Constitution

established islands of governmental powers ‘surrounded by a
sea of individual rights,’ not ‘islands [of individual
rights] surrounded by a sea of governmental powers.’” 110
For example, to determine whether a state’s
constitutional guarantee of a patient’s right to access
medicinal marijuana is fundamental, we must first look at
historical and traditional views of patient’s rights.

For

instance, in California patients have a historically
fundamental interest in alleviating pain under the

107

Id.
Id at 1259.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1260 (quoting Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The
Constitution 27 (1986).
108
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Calfornia Constitution. 111

Applying the first prong of

Massey’s test, the burden would then shift to the
government to prove that it has a valid justification for
intruding on the patient’s private conduct, such as keeping
citizens off of illegal substances or removing those
substances from interstate commerce.
MASSEY’S SECOND PRONG
Second, the proposed right must not significantly
impair other existing and recognized fundamental rights,
since the creation of new right has the capability of
“reducing the stock” of rights already held by other
people. 112

To discharge this aspect of the test, Massey

asserts, the judiciary would have the responsibility of
weighing rights against one another: 113
“The court would be required to assess the
‘fundamental’ status of the right being infringed
by a claimed. If deemed fundamental, it would be
necessary
to
determine
the
degree
of
infringement.
Only if the infringement were
substantial
should
the
putative
[N]inth
[A]mendment right be denied recognition, since it
will be recalled that this test operates only
when the source of the right in collision with
the [N]inth [A]mendment right is also located
outside of the Constitution.” 114

111
112
113
114

See Raich, supra note 5.
Massey, supra note 93, at 1257.
Id at 1262.
Id at 1262-63.
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For instance, a state constitutional provision that
seeks to guarantee its citizens the right to practice
private racial discrimination directly conflicts with
federal Constitutional law, so there is no need to apply
Massey’s test in this situation. 115
However, an individual citizen’s state constitutional
right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures could
directly conflict with a federal agency’s duty to protect
the public, which is an exercise of federal regulation
rather than an enforcement of a Constitutional provision.
Thus, Massey’s test would be proper in this situation.
Similarly, as was the case in Ashwander, the federal
government’s regulatory right in a particular field could
conflict with a state’s collective right to locally manage
that area. 116

Thus, applying the second prong of Massey’s

test, a court would have to balance the two competing
interests involved before determining which of the two
rights should prevail.
MASSEY’S FINAL PRONG
The final prong of Massey’s test provides that the
asserted Ninth Amendment right cannot operate in a fashion
that unreasonably exports the social costs of the right. 117
115
116
117

Id at 1263.
See Ashwander, supra note 75.
Id.
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He argues that once Ninth Amendment rights are recognized,
units of government could be susceptible to “factional
alliances” set-up to capture the “machinery of government
and deliver benefits to the faction’s members, the costs of
which will be borne by citizens not affiliated with the
dominant factions.” 118
Massey’s third prong closely resembles the dormant
commerce clause, under which a state law that benefits its
citizens while exporting the cost of that benefit out of
state will violate the Constitution.

For example, in

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 119 the Supreme
Court determined that an Iowa statute limiting the use of
certain large trucks within the state unconstitutionally
limited interstate commerce.
There, the state statute prohibited the use of 65-foot
trucks, while most trucks were limited to 55-feet. 120
Although the state argued the truck size limit was related
to safety, the Court found that Iowa “seems to have hoped
to limit the use of its highways by deflecting some through
traffic,” which violates the Commerce Clause. 121

Thus, the

costs of the benefit to the state’s citizens (less traffic

118

Massey, supra note 93 at 1263.
450 U.S. 662 (1981).
120
Id. at 665-66. Some trucks carrying farm equipment, livestock and
mobile homes were permitted to be 60-feet long.
121
Id. at 677.
119
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on the state highways, which would translate to lower costs
for maintaining those highways) would be exported out of
the state.
Massey proposes two questions to address this issue.
First, if the state right at issue is one that on its face
is designed to capture benefits for local residents at the
expense of outsiders (as was the case in Kassel), the right
cannot be elevated to Ninth Amendment status. 122
Second, if the right is facially neutral but imposes a
disproportionate share of costs on outsiders while vesting
a disproportionate share of benefits with insiders, that
right must also fail Ninth Amendment scrutiny. 123

For

instance, in a resource-rich state that can generate
electrical energy cheaply, the state amends its
constitution to provide its citizens with free electricity
and pays private companies to provide that service with
revenue generated by new taxes on all electricity exported
out of the state. In that situation, the benefit of the
right would lie with the citizens of the state while
arguably the costs would be exported out of the state.
Thus, a federal court examining such a case would have to
weigh the state’s interest in exercising their state

122
123

Massey, supra note 93, at 1264.
Id.
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constitutional right against the burden such an exercise
would export to citizens outside the state before giving
that right Ninth Amendment status.
Massey concludes that utilizing his three-pronged
test, though not void of problems, would preserve the
delicate balance between state autonomy and national
uniformity as envisioned by the Framers 124 :
“Use of the [N]inth [A]mendment in the fashion
advocated here will create some friction at the
margins; such a condition is probably always
present in federal systems.
But that friction
can be alleviated by a judiciary that understands
the importance of federalism to the preservation
of human liberty. The [N]inth [A]mendment stands
as a (now) silent reproach to those who urge the
abandonment of judicial efforts to police the
frontier
between
federal
power
and
state125
guaranteed rights.”
APPLYING THE MASSEY TEST TODAY
The most important benefit of applying Massey’s test
is that states would retain their autonomy as a distinct
sovereign government free to protect their citizens,
consistent with the intent of the Founders and the spirit
of the Ninth Amendment.

However, there are several

additional problems that stem from the collision of the
federal government’s right to set a national policy and a

124
125

Id. at 1266.
Id.
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state’s ability to veto that policy by enforcing its
unenumerated rights.

126

MORE THAN FIFTY ONE DIFFERENT BODIES OF LAW WILL APPLY IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The first and most obvious implication of adopting
Ninth Amendment rights in the manner suggested by Massey is
that there could be fifty one different bodies of state law
that would be potentially applicable in federal court
through the Ninth Amendment, sacrificing whatever
uniformity federal Constitutional law was once thought to
have.

Massey noted that his approach would produce a

federal system with a “richly variegated pattern.” 127

By

recognizing Ninth Amendment rights, whenever a state adopts
a new principal of state constitutional law, it adds to the
substantive body of law in that jurisdiction.

If a federal

court examining a federal question had to look to different
bodies of law each time a Ninth Amendment right was

126

See New Mexico Governor Calls for Legalizing Drugs, CNN.com (October
6, 1999), available at
http://www.cnn.com/us/9910/06/legalizing.drugs.01/, for an example of
just such a situation. Former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson
attempted to legalize marijuana and heroin in New Mexico because he
deemed the national war on drugs a failure in part because the social
and financial costs of the failed effort fell directly on the citizens
of New Mexico. If the New Mexico legislature had approved such a
measure, a situation similar to that in Raich would arise.
127
Massey, supra note 93, at 1248.
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claimed, the federal system of laws might become
unmanageable. 128
However, Massey points out, the federal system
consistently applies the Erie 129 doctrine in diversity
cases:
“It has not proven burdensome for the federal
courts to manage with fifty-one different legal
regimes in diversity cases under the rule of
Erie…Thus, it is unlikely to be much more
difficult for the courts to rely on state
constitutional law to breathe life into this
substantive
dimension
of
the
[N]inth
130
[A]mendment.”
In Erie, the Supreme Court struck down the Swift v.
Tyson 131 rule that federal courts were not required to apply
the decisions of local tribunals, but only state statutes
and long-established local customs having the force of
laws. 132

The Court recognized that there is no federal

general common law, and Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state,
“whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be
they commercial law or part of the law of torts…no clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon

128

Diversity jurisdiction is the only time a federal court would have to
examine more than one body of law since in all other situations a
federal court applies the law of its forum state.
129
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
130
Massey, supra note 93, at 1248.
131
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
132
See The Erie End of Swift, 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 471
(Updated May 2004).
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the federal courts.” 133

It then invalidated Swift, holding

that “this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to
the several states.” 134

Thus, except in matters governed by

the federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the state. 135
Therefore, from this language it appears that Erie is
entirely compatible with Massey’s approach, and any test
that is developed should seek to apply the doctrine.
IF AN AREA OF STATE LAW IS UNCLEAR
Applying an Erie like analysis it is clear that when a
Ninth Amendment right is asserted, a federal court should
look to the law of the state creating the right.

However,

what if the issue presented to the federal court involves
an area of state law that is either unclear or undefined?
This is an area where unlike the Erie doctrine, the
federal court should not guess as to the meaning of the
state constitution in defining the boundaries of the
asserted Ninth Amendment.

Otherwise, the states would lose

their ability to “check” the power of the federal
government the moment their fundamental rights are defined
by the federal judiciary.
133
134
135

The federal courts could refuse

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
Id at 80.
Id at 78.
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to recognize any such rights, denying judicial enforcement
of the asserted Ninth Amendment right, and “the fox would
be guarding the henhouse.” 136
There are two ways to handle these situations when
they arise.

The first, easiest, and most logical approach

is to utilize the state’s certification procedure if one
exists.

The state court would then clarify the unclear

area of state law for the federal court, which could then
proceed with Massey’s test:
“Certification…allows a federal court faced with a
novel state-law question to put the question directly
to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay,
cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of
gaining an authoritative response.” 137
Most states have just such a certification process in
place, so extending those provisions to include unclear
areas of state law whenever a Ninth Amendment claim is
asserted is feasible.
If no certification procedure is available, the
federal court could utilize a Pullman-type abstention and
refrain from deciding the Ninth Amendment question when the
area of state law is unclear. 138

In this context, however,

136

Allen, supra note 1, at 1662.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
138
See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
(establishing that a federal court may, and normally should, refrain
from deciding a case in which state action is challenged in federal
court as contrary to the federal constitution if there are unsettled
questions of state law that may be dispositive of the case and avoid
137
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rather than a Pullman-like retention of jurisdiction, the
federal court should deny the Ninth Amendment Claim.

The

reasoning behind this is if a claimed state right is
unclear under state law, it should not be considered a
right for purposes of the Ninth Amendment because there
would be no clear expression of the intent of “the people.”
ONE FINAL PROBLEM
Perhaps the most intriguing problem arises when asking
what, if any, appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court
should have to review decisions of a federal court looking
to state law.

Under Michigan v. Long, 139 if a state court

decision is clearly and expressly based on separate,
adequate and independent state law grounds, the Supreme
Court does not have jurisdiction to review that decision. 140
Long was decided in order to avoid examining state law to
decide the nature of a state court decision and to avoid
the danger of “rendering advisory opinions.” 141
Nevertheless, in order to federalize Ninth Amendment
rights it would be necessary, at least initially, for a
federal court to review state law under Massey’s test.
While those rights would be federalized through the Ninth

the need for deciding the constitutional question). However, with the
development of certification, abstention is discouraged.
139
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
140
Id. at 1041.
141
Id.
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Amendment, the basis for the formation of those rights lies
on separate, adequate and independent state law grounds.
Thus, the question to be answered before Massey’s test
could be implemented is whether the decision in Long
applies to the Supreme Court’s review of federal decisions
recognizing Ninth Amendment rights.
The answer is complicated, particularly since the
Supreme Court has the power to review federal
Constitutional questions, which includes the Ninth
Amendment but not state constitutional rulings that do not
violate federal law.

However, if the Supreme Court were

allowed to choose what unenumerated rights were deemed
worthy of federal incorporation, the Court would encroach
on that state’s autonomy, defeating the original purpose
and intent of the Ninth Amendment.
There is, however, a way around the perceived Long
problem.

The Supreme Court would not decide whether there

is a right under state law, it would simply examine the
federal court’s application of the Massey balancing test.
When a Ninth Amendment right is claimed in federal court,
the court would apply the Massey test and determine whether
the state constitutional right should be federally

45

incorporated. 142

If the federal court determines that a

Ninth Amendment right exists after applying the Massey
criteria, the right would then be federally enforceable
through the Ninth Amendment, so the Supreme Court would
have jurisdiction to examine the new Constitutional
question.

However, the Supreme Court would not be

examining whether the state right exists or the state
court’s application of its constitutional law that created
the right.

Rather, it would only review the federal

court’s application of the Massey test to determine whether
the test’s criteria have been met.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Brennan suggested, 143 the Ninth Amendment
will never take its rightful place in the Constitution as
the guardian of unenumerated rights unless a system is
established that can adequately protect state autonomy
without seriously hampering Congressional power to pursue a
legitimate national policy.

Professor Massey’s test is a

plausible and effective method through which the goals of

142

This would also be applicable to questions involving unclear areas of
state law that a federal court certifies to the state’s supreme court,
but only if the state court determines that a fundamental right exists
under state constitutional law. If the state court determines that no
right exists, or if the federal court chooses to abstain from answering
the state law question rather than certifying the question, the false
Long problem would be moot.
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the Ninth Amendment can finally be realized, consistent
with the intent of the Framers.
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